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ABSTRACT 
 
Black Economic Empowerment (“BEE”) or Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) is an important socio economic tool that the South African government 
established to achieve its transformational objectives. BBBEE is meant to assist in growing 
the economy, decrease economic and other social inequalities and to introduce more 
black people in the mainstream economy of South Africa. The transformation strategies 
such as BBBEE and employment equity seek to redress economic imbalances created by 
the previous apartheid regime. BBBEE as an implemented policy has contributed in 
levelling the playing field by creating vast opportunities for the previously disadvantaged. 
Positive spin offs that have been realised in an effort to address economic and social 
imbalances are discussed in the paper 
 
The paper seeks to demonstrate the progress made in South Africa by the BBBEE act and 
the efforts of corporate South Africa. It further highlights successes of BBBEE deals 
implemented recently and analyse how these empowerment deals were structured. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of specific BBBEE investments with reference to 
specific landmark broad based deals concluded in the recent past. The efficiency of the 
funding structures of these BBBEE deals is also analysed. Finally chapter 5 concludes by 
providing an overview of the findings in analysing the efficiency of BBBEE funding 
structures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 Introduction 
The dawn of democracy in South Africa in 1994 signaled an important phase for many 
marginalised South Africans. To this marginalized constituency this change meant the total 
dismantling of the old order and the reversal of socio-economic and political domination of 
a minority group to an era of shared growth and development. Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) was one of the vehicles needed and used to ensure that African 
people’s freedom was not symbolic but was realised in all segments of society, including 
the economy. The major issues the new democratic government faced was amongst other 
things poverty, high levels of unemployment, a largely under skilled work force and the fact 
that the majority of the population was significantly uneducated. 
 
 
1.2 Background 
The introduction of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme in the post-1994 
era is part of the new democratic government strategy of integrating the increasing number 
of previously excluded individuals to participate into the mainstream of the economy. 
Initially, the new government used the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) as a South Africa’s transformation plan that would address the socioeconomic ills 
that were brought by the previous apartheid system. The domination of business activities 
by white business and the exclusion of black people and women from the mainstream of 
economic activity were sources of great concern for the reconstruction and development 
process. A central objective of the RDP was to deracialise business ownership and control 
completely through focused BEE policies. These policies were aimed at making it easier 
for black people to gain access to capital for business development. The democratic 
government was obliged to ensure that no discrimination occurs in financial institutions. 
State and parastatal institutions were to provide capital for the attainment of BEE 
objectives. The democratic government also introduced tendering out procedures to 
facilitate BEE. Training and education, meaningful ownership participation was identified 
as priorities.  
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The first wave of BEE deals (often referred to as narrow BEE) concluded from 1994 to 
2003 were found to be narrow and innefective as there was no BEE legislation in place 
then. Over this period, BEE attracted a lot of criticism as the deals were not broad based 
but enriched only a few politically connected black elites.  For instance, in 2003, 60% of 
the empowerment deals amounting to R25.3 billion went to the companies of only two 
black businessmen (Kovacevic 2007). Kovacevic (2007) further argued that although BEE 
professes to promote the meaningful participation of black people in the economy, it 
actually fosters a political cronyism that benefits only a few elite. A majority of the deals 
done during this time focused only on the transfer of ownership where private companies 
would identify strategic partners and enter into BEE deals with them. These partners 
mostly played no role in the day to day running of the business and had little or no control 
as most of their shares had little voting power.  
 
BEE is a restructuring and affirmative measure aimed at ensuring that the previously 
marginalised are placed at the centre of the economy. Therefore BEE is broader than 
procurement and ownership. Unfortunately with its good intentions BEE also has many 
drawbacks including crony capitalism and the empowerment of only a select few. 
 
All of the above criticisms and other research undertaken by policy makers together with 
business gave rise to Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE). The BBBEE 
act 53 of 2003 was promulgated on 9 January 2004. The broad based policy focus on 
more than just mere direct empowerment through ownership. Other objective includes 
skills development, enterprise development, development and promotion of people with 
disabilities and women and children empowerment. One of the biggest obstacles to the 
ownership objective of BBBEE and also BEE as a whole is the availability of capital to buy 
into existing business or to start a new venture to benefit through the preferential 
procurement aspect.  
 
BBBEE is currently under the spotlight for various reasons. BBBEE is still seen as a failure 
by many with little evidence of successful broad-based deals that have been concluded in 
recent years. Amendments have been made to the initial act implemented in 2003 twice, in 
2007 and recently in 2011/2012. The focus of the amendments relates to fraudulent 
empowerment credentials, fronting and the linking of BEE to other government economic 
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growth strategies. Government is currently emphasising that empowerment efforts should 
result in the promotion of a culture of venturing into new territories, operational excellence 
and risk taking. Focus on businesses and industries that result in significant job creation 
and addressing socio economic challenges. Furthermore, there should be symbiotic 
relationship between the public and the private sector and amongst private sector players, 
and large and small enterprises to unlock opportunities. 
 
Business ventures need funding to commence and sustain operational activities and 
financing of empowerment deals and empowered businesses however has proven to be 
quite problematic. Many BEE deals concluded in the past have failed and the funding 
strategy used has been highlighted as one of the reasons for their failure. The failure had 
unintended consequences such as increased financing cost for future deals, no real 
empowerment for the intended benefactors, and significant decrease of value for the firms 
that pursued black empowerment. 
 
This study seeks to analyse the efficiency of the different funding models used to facilitate 
BBBEE deals to create value for black people as defined and intended. Taking into 
consideration other factors, this research shows whether the benefits (returns) outweigh 
the costs (financing cost) incurred for putting together the BBBEE transaction. The study 
focuses on broad based empowerment deals that invited the broader public (individuals, 
groups of black investors, schools, churches etc) to subscribe for shares and the use of an 
employee empowerment scheme to achieve empowerment. The financial performance of 
both the empowerment firm and investors will be analysed. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
Terreblanch (2002) argues that although private and public institutions have implemented 
BEE in a variety of forms, it has yet to bring about increased black participation in the 
economy. He further highlights a lack of participation of the broader population in BEE. In 
the year 2003, in their BEE strategy report, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
stated that it remains critical that effective and sustainable funding structures be put in 
place. The problem is that, we know and understand the funding models used to finance 
BEE transactions (see Oyowole, 1996 and Nhlapo, 2008) but we do not know how efficient 
and sustainable these funding models are and the reason why they are seen by many as a 
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source of BEE deals’ failure. The research is required to unpack whether the problem lies 
with the structure of the funding model or elsewhere. Taking into consideration other 
factors, this research can show whether the benefits (returns) outweigh the costs incurred 
for putting together BEE transactions using various funding models. 
 
1.4 Research Objectives  
The study will be guided by the following specific research objectives:  
 To establish whether the mixed financing structures used in recent BBBEE deals are 
efficient.  
 To assess whether common South Africans who participated in BBBEE deals are 
empowered.  
 
1.5 Research Questions 
 Does the short and long term return of the recently mixed funded BBBEE deals 
exceed the finance cost incurred to facilitate the empowerment deals? 
 How effective are the funding structures /mixed of funding used by the firms who 
invited the broader public to participate in the BBBEE deals? 
 Are the participants of the BBBEE economically better off and empowered? 
 
1.6 Gap and significance of the study 
Sartorius and Botha (2008) found that less than 25% of equity is eventually transferred to 
empowerment partners and that the primary source of funding for empowerment 
transactions were third party funding. Ward and Muller (2008) looked at the long term 
impact of BEE companies following the announcement of BEE ownership transactions. 
Researchers (e.g. Nhlapo 2008,) have only looked at the reasons why early BEE funding 
models failed. Research has been done on the evolution and innovation of funding 
structures’, the efficiency of structures used during the first and second wave of BEE 
deals, and whether the funding inefficiencies identified during the first phase were 
addressed when second wave of deals were implemented. Andrews (2008) investigated 
whether BEE is a growth catalyst and recommended that BEE specifically targets the 
middle and bottom end of the economy. Research was also undertaken to identify and 
evaluate the major challenges faced when structuring empowerment deals. No research 
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evidence could be found on whether the recent uses of mixed funding structures are 
efficient. Research has also not been undertaken to establish whether the BBBEE deals 
created the economic empowerment for the broader population it sought benefit. 
 
This study will prove to be important and useful for policy makers, finance students and 
companies who intend to do empowerment transactions in future. Future users will be able 
to use the study to improve empowerment deal structuring based on this assessment of 
the importance of funding structures to the success of empowerment deals. Students and 
academics can use the study to identify areas for further study or to substantiate and 
compliment their studies. Firms can also use the study to identify important features that 
could enhance successful implementation of empowerment deals. The study can also be 
used as publicity by the firms being studied. 
 
1.7  Structure of Thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 deals comprehensively with literature review 
of BEE research that has been undertaken. The use of different and innovative funding 
structures is discussed as well as entrepreneurial finance in South Africa. It aims at 
gaining a deeper understanding of BEE for the chosen subject and act as the foundation 
for conducting research. Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology used. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the study and Chapter 5 discuss the findings and conclude the 
thesis. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter serves as the introduction to the thesis regarding efficacy of the funding 
structures used to finance BEE transactions in order to address the issues identified 
above. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 presents the background to the 
study. Section 1.3 presents the problem statement. Section 1.4 provides the research 
objectives. Section 1.5 presents the research questions. Section 1.6 presents the research 
gap and the significance of the study. Section 1.7 presents the structure of the thesis 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to give a literature review on BBE, Entrepreneurial 
financing and Corporate funding determinants and to define the types of empowerment 
funding models that has been used. In analysing the different models, one will be able to 
identify advantages and disadvantages; similarities as well as limitations ,restrictions and 
contradictions amongst the BEE funding models that are commonly used in South Africa. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 present the overview of BEE. Section 2.3 
discusses entrepreneurial financing. Section 2.4 discusses corporate funding determinants 
and section 2.5 discusses firm funding and capital structure. Section 2.6 discusses funding 
structures used in previous deals and section 2.7 presents an overview of BEE research 
undertaken previously. 
 
2.2  Overview of BEE 
In the post-apartheid era, the new government that came to power in 1994 was faced with 
huge economic inequalities, pervasive poverty and high levels of unemployment. The 
social and economic implications of the previous laws of apartheid excluded the majority of 
South African people, mainly black people, from the mainstream of the economy. To 
address inequalities, combat poverty and reduce unemployment, government promulgated 
empowerment legislation and policies in the form of the Employment Equity Act (Act 55 of 
1998), Skills Development Levy Act (Act 9 of 1999) and Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework Act (Act 5 of 2000) and encouraged the development of BEE charters for all 
sectors to support the empowerment and transformation of the economy. Key to this 
transformation has been the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) 
programme. The effort to include black people in the economy is in line with Mikhail 
Bakunin (1870) who argues “Political Freedom without economic equality is pretence, a 
fraud, a lie; and the workers [people] want no lying. 
 
BEE is considered as one of the key drivers of economic activity with more than half of 
privately owned businesses expected to change ownership within the next decade. The 
question that however remains unanswered per Kritzinger (2004) is whether broad based 
economic empowerment will bear the fruits for the intended beneficiaries and more 
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importantly are financing models used in BEE transactions efficient and appropriate. 
The face of the JSE has been on a gradual transformation path. Anecdotal evidence 
shows that BEE has made relative inroads to the extent that currently 21% of listed 
companies are black owned.  
2.3 Entrepreneurial Finance 
Entrepreneurship in South Africa is not as prominent as politics and the country’s mineral 
resources. Many experts (e.g., Ojah and Mokoteli (2010), Makina et al., (2004)) indicated 
that entrepreneurship is one of the biggest drivers of economic activity, growth and job 
creation. Entrepreneurship can be effective and meaningfully reduce poverty as well as 
close the gap between the rich and poor in the country (Makina and Malobola, 2004). 
 
The most competitive nations are believed to be those that have the highest level of 
entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurial activities need funding to prosper. Entrepreneurs 
need to know that financiers would be willing to back their ventures financially without 
charging them exorbitant fees. Funding is believed to be one of the biggest obstacles to 
start-up ventures in South Africa. Ojah and Mokoteli (2010) found important causes of 
relative poor entrepreneurial funding in SA to be amongst other factors the lack of 
appreciation for the link between SA’s first and second economy, the incorrect emphasis 
by government which favours entrepreneurial finance over developmental micro financing; 
the inappropriate business oriented lending designs of finance agencies and the lack of 
emphasis on micro savings. Ojah and Mokoteli (2010) also recommend possible solutions 
to the problems identified. The solutions are increased venture capital and angel financing, 
increased capital leases and trade credit and a more developmental focused microfinance 
scheme strategy. The BeeCom report (2000) reported that South Africa does not have a 
venture capital market, which has played an influential role in stimulating entrepreneurship 
internationally. 
2.4  Corporate Funding determinants 
BEE transactions may be viewed as unique corporate finance deals unlike most business 
deals, but BEE transactions are subject to conventional corporate finance decision 
considerations. The transactions are unique because the objective of the deals is not 
solely to maximise shareholder wealth or other conventional finance objectives such as 
growth or owner exit strategies but rather to transform the ownership status of firms. The 
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maximization of shareholder wealth, can however not be ignored because deals are done 
to economically empower the intended beneficiaries. 
  
The other more important factor that contributes to the uniqueness BBBEE deals is the 
lack of financial and other resources that are required by the intended beneficiaries to be 
economically empowered by the deals. Mokoteli and Ojah (2013) argue that BEE 
transactions are akin to spin-offs and ownership restructuring. They argue that although 
BEE companies are not directly spun off from existing companies, the relationship 
between them ends up like that of a parent and a subsidiary. 
 
Business ventures are financed either through equity or debt or a combinationtherof. 
Besides the cost of funding, researchers such as Andani, Al Hassan (2012) and Mutenheri 
& Green (2002) found that capital structure determinants among listed companies include: 
size, profitability, growth, and asset maturity structure and non-debt tax shields. Adnani & 
Al Hassan (2012) found that, size, maturity structure and non-debt tax shields have been 
found to be related positively and significantly to total debt ratio. Profitability and growth 
are negatively and significantly related to total debt ratio amongst listed companies.  
 
On the other hand for non-listed companies, the Adnani & Al Hassan (2012) found size, 
liquidity and non-debt tax shields to have significant and positive relationships with capital 
structure while profitability and maturity structure are negatively and significantly related to 
total debt ratio. 
 
It is important as deduced from the above discussion that BBBEE deals cannot be 
structured without considering the fundamentals of corporate finance and the conventional 
corporate finance determinants. Wealth creation for the intended beneficiaries is the 
objective of these deals, it is therefore important that all the fundamental considerations of 
corporate finance be taken into account when deals are structured. 
 
2.5 Firm Funding and Capital Structure 
Various studies have been performed on optimal capital structures. Miller and Modigliani 
(1958) is perhaps the most cited in this regard. They argue that both capital structure and 
dividend policy are largely “irrelevant” in the sense that they have no significant, 
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predictable effects on corporate market values. The agency and signalling theories 
(Manos, 2001) on the other hand suggest that dividend payments could lead to overall 
increase in firm value. Other theories such as transactional cost and tax theories state that 
dividend payments reduce shareholders wealth and should not be paid but the cash 
should be invested in other projects. These theories are particularly interesting for BEE 
transactions because several BEE transactions are indirectly financed by dividends. 
Therefore dividend policies play an important role for many firms wishing to conclude 
empowerment transactions as they are a major determinant in the repayment rate of 
debts.  
 
According to Mutenheri and Green (2002) the main variables suggested by theory which 
are usually thought to influence a company’s capital structure are derived from four main 
strands of literature. These theories have been the subject of research by amongst others 
(Frank and Goyal, 2002; Bharat, Pasquariello and Wu, 2008). First, asymmetric 
information theory states that debt is preferred over equity when firms’ source funding 
because a debt issuance may signal management’s confidence regarding the firms’ 
profitability prospects. Second, pecking order theory posits that firms prefer internal to 
external finance because the cost of financing increases with asymmetric information. 
External equity issues are therefore seen as the last resort when firms’ source funding. 
Third is agency theory which state that increased leverage imposes financial discipline on 
management and the asset substitution effect which posts that as debt to equity ratio 
increases management has stronger incentive to undertake risky project as shareholders 
wealth would be maximised significantly should the project be successful. Fourth is 
transactions costs theory which states that transaction cost has an impact on market 
timing and that firms may prefer the use of debt over equity due to the direct cost involved 
in equity issuances. Last is the issue of taxation. Thus, firms may prefer debt over equity 
because of the tax shield that debt may offer.  
 
Firms therefore, consider a number of determinants when deciding how to finance in 
particular long term business transactions such as mergers and acquisitions and other 
long term projects. Empowerment transactions are very unique in that the targeted 
beneficiaries are not very well capitalised and therefore need financing in one form or 
another to become equity holders of the company that seeks black economic 
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empowerment. Empowerment partners (individuals and organisations) in most 
circumstances have no choice but to access debt funding to facilitate participation in 
empowerment transactions. This can be complicated further due to the fact that the 
empowerment partners may have little to no collateral. This may significantly drive up the 
cost of capital as the absence of collateral increase the risk profile of the lenders and may 
further force firms to deviate from their target capital structures and conventional capital 
structure theories. Firms may be forced to use more equity, or other hybrid financially 
engineered instruments for funding purposes, that may alter their capital structures. 
 
2.6 BEE transactions and funding models used  
The lack of capital and collateral required by BEE investors to fund BEE transactions as 
mentioned above pose a significant challenge to all stakeholders. Government has 
introduced various initiatives to accelerate and promote BEE. To this end they have 
established finance providers such as the National Empowerment Fund (NEF) to assist 
with the financing and structuring of BEE deals. The mandate of the Industrial 
development Corporation (IDC) also has a huge focus on BEE activity.  
 
2.2.1 BEE first wave: 1994-2002  
South Africans irrespective of race or gender could finally participate in the mainstream 
economy because of the demise of apartheid. A significant drive to ensure participation of 
black people in the financial markets, big mining houses and other industries were kick 
started by the private corporations and the newly elected democratic government. The 
emphasis of these transactions was to ensure black participation at ownership level only 
and did not include other elements of empowerment such as effective and sustained 
management, skills transfer, and development of young black talent and creation of other 
black businesses. Nhlapo (2008) comprehensively describes the various funding 
instruments and models used to finance the first wave of BEE deals. She also shed some 
light on the probable causes of the failures of the transactions, the role that the type of 
funding played and discuss the evolution of funding during the second phase of BEE deals 
(BBBEE). 
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2.6.1.1 Special Purpose Vehicle  
Van der Nest (2004) defines an SPV as a special purpose company established by a 
'BEE-company', with the objective to facilitate the purchase of an equity stake in a 'target 
company'. According to the BEE Commission report (2001), the target company can either 
be a company listed on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange or a private company, 
interested in selling an equity stake to empowerment partners  
 
Government Agencies, the Public Investment Corporation local and international through 
various initiatives provide funding to Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) which in turn 
provides black people with capital to acquire shares. The funding provided to the SPV’s is 
generally guaranteed by the company seeking BEE credentials through the empowerment 
transaction.  
 
The BEE company raises the required means to fund the deal either through a 100% loan 
from financiers such as the NEF, IDC or commercial banks. BEE companies in the past 
also made use of preference shares, or a combination of loans and preference shares with 
varying repayment and redemption terms. Various structuring methods were used to 
finance SPVs. For example, mezzanine debt, vendor financing, notional loans and senior 
debt instruments were common. In most instances no equity was required. Where equity 
was not required then the money would be borrowed in most cases. During the first phase 
of BEE transactions in the late 1990s, black investors were typically funded by third parties 
utilising SPVs. Oyewole (1996) summarises the other three main funding methods 
employed during the first phase in black economic empowerment transactions as shown 
below. 
 
2.6.1.2  Equity participation without economic facilitation  
The black empowerment investor acquires shares in the listed company, by forming a SPV 
which is funded by corporate investors. The corporate investors hold low-voting class B 
shares in the SPV while voting control will be ceded to the black empowerment investors 
through class A voting shares.  
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2.6.1.3 Equity participation at a discount  
Shares in listed or private companies are sold to the black empowered investor at a 
discount to the fair value. The discount becomes a benefit to the black partner and enables 
or facilitates the transaction. Discounts varied in size. These shares would frequently have 
limitations and restrictions on dividends and tradability for a set period of time. 
 
2.6.1.4  Put option granted by existing shareholders  
The black investor is offered shares in the hosting company in which the purchase 
consideration is funded by a financial institution through a loan. The debt is guaranteed by 
a put option against the existing shareholders in the hosting company. The black partner 
owns ordinary shares in an established SPV. The bank then provides funding to the SPV 
through buying preference shares in the SPV. The money raised will then be used to 
subscribe for the portion of the offered shares in the hosting company. In the event that the 
black partner is unable to redeem the preference shares, the bank may sell the preference 
shares that it holds in the SPV to the existing shareholders in terms of the put option 
arrangement.  
 
2.6.1.5  Failures of the First Phase Models  
According to Business Map (1999), the first phase of BEE implementation came to an 
abrupt halt with the Asian crises of 1998. The crisis revealed some problems that affect the 
sustainability of the BEE financing models, which formed the foundation of most of BEE 
transactions during the 1990's. BusinessMap (1999) identified the extremely high levels of 
gearing as a core weakness in the initial BEE financial models. Instead of using access to 
finance, to build an asset base, most BEE transactions accumulated debt via the SPV's 
structures used at the time. The high dependence of these deals on debt was cited as one 
of the main causes of failures. Financial institutions and other providers of capital, play a 
crucial role in determining the pace and success of black economic empowerment. 
 
Some of the disadvantages of the first wave models that led to failures of the BEE deals 
and not meeting BEE objectives include: One, the funding structures were mostly 
developed to be successful only in bull stock market situation, and not in a bear market. 
Two, preference shares used do not normally carry voting rights and therefore black 
partners do not take part in company strategic decisions. Three, these preference shares 
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form part of contractual obligation and therefore cannot be easily traded (BEE shares are 
locked in for a specific period). Therefore, there was a lack of flexibility and liquidity on 
SPV structures. Four, dividend policies of the host companies were not aligned to ensure 
that the SPV’s or BEE companies receive cash on a regular basis to service and redeem 
debt. Five, limited restrictions with regards to whether shares could be encumbered by 
target beneficiaries were in place. This could lead to beneficiaries encumbering their 
shares to finance otherwise unaffordable lifestyles.  
 
2.2.2  BEE second wave: 2003 - current  
The failures of the first wave of BEE deals placed pressure on all stakeholders to innovate 
and come up with new transaction structures that will be less sensitive to financing cost, 
more effectively geared and have a bigger impact on the broader economy, particularly the 
middle to low end of the economy. The highly geared BEE structures complicated the 
economic empowerment of black people.  
 
In order to promote BEE activity, the government decided to reward BEE deals that 
successfully transfer economic benefits to previously disadvantaged groups. Government 
therefore, started to reward businesses with empowerment credentials by giving them 
preference to government tenders and other government business opportunities. Many 
however, argue that this just increased fronting and corruption.  
 
In this second wave of BEE, funding structures evolved slightly as stakeholders attempted 
to curb the problems encountered with the initial wave of deals. This meant the new 
structures may have become more elaborate and complex because they combined debt, 
equity and hybrid instruments (such as deferred shares, options and preference shares). 
These complex and elaborate structures may hinder the ordinary black people to 
participate in these deals because it is difficult to understand them.  
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The focus is to develop and implement innovative financing structures that will ensure 
efficiency, sustainability and specifically envisage to pursuing the ideals of black economic 
empowerment. The acquisition of equity, for the BEE deals may now be vendor-financed 
call options driven as well as other more conventional methods of funding involving third 
party financing. These BBBEE funding models are discussed in detail below 
 
2.6.2.1 Third Party Finance  
The most common type of funding for any transaction during the second wave of BEE is 
third party loans which involve bank loans or loans from other financial service providers. 
These finance providers wants to reduce their risk as much as possible by requiring 
collateral, sureties or guarantees.  Should loans be without guarantees or collateral it is 
normally more expensive due to the perceived increased risk. 
 
There are other various structures that are considered by financiers on offering finance, 
but the most favoured are the leveraged buy-outs (LBOs) and preference share structures. 
An LBO is the purchase of equity or other assets using significantly more borrowed money 
(debt) than owners’ funds (equity).The debt effectively serves as a lever to increase 
returns. The targeted assets or equity is in most cases used as security for the loans. On 
the other hand, BEE companies issue preference shares to purchase equity stakes or 
other assets in host companies. The BEE Company depend on dividend payments from 
the target company (parent companies ) to ensure that it meets its day to day operational 
cost and more importantly service financing cost. Preference shares are still very popular 
funding instruments because of the flexibility that it provides. Preference dividends may be 
accumulated, and therefore reduces the risk of default. Preference shares may also be 
converted into ordinary shares and may carry voting rights or structured to carry voting 
rights in case of defaults. 
 
2.6.2.2 Vendor Finance  
Vendor companies facilitate BEE transactions through providing loan guarantees, price 
discounts, or internal notional vendor financing at or below market rates to BEE investors. 
This type of financing lowers the risk of the investment as it may increase investor 
confidence. 
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Regardless of the transaction structure, there is almost always a requirement from the 
financiers that the vendor facilitate the raising of finance for the BEE partner. Whichever 
structure is selected, and even if no vendor finance is provided, financiers tend to look for 
some form of guarantee from the vendor. Most financiers are risk averse and require some 
form of security on loans granted, which in most cases the BEE partners cannot provide. 
 
Vendor finance companies are regarded necessary to enable deal makers to negotiate 
lower interest rates. High inflation coupled with the fact that black investors lack assets to 
pledge as security for borrowings results in financing that require high returns. This in turn 
necessitates that the BEE investor must earn a high return on investment to be able to 
make loan repayments. Examples of empowerment transaction that used vendor finance 
include amongst others Imperial and Alexander Forbes.  
 
The funding models discussed above have the following characteristics in common. One, 
the hosting company mostly facilitates the BEE deal. The BEE company experiences 
benefits if the share price or earnings grow. Two, the real equity transfer only occurs once 
debt is redeemed and all limitations and restrictions are lifted. Three, the equity interest in 
the hosting company may be diluted because of the inability of the black partner to pay 
back the loan and because black people require access to cash and therefore sell the 
share in the open market should all the restrictions be lifted 
 
2.7  BEE research 
Previous research on BEE has investigated different aspects of BEE transactions. An 
Empowerdex (2005) study could not find any evidence that suggest that BEE negatively 
influence business confidence or foreign direct investment levels. Andrews (2008) looked 
at whether BEE is a growth catalyst or not and listed recommendations that could lead to 
BEE being a growth catalyst. Andrews (2008) recommended amongst other things that 
government should emphasise that deals are conducted with new entrants and 
government should focus on building pools of young talented skilled black professionals 
and should focus its BEE policy at the middle and bottom of the economy. Fauconnier and 
Mathur-Helm (2008) found that there is an increased focus on ensuring genuine and 
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sustainable broad-based BEE in South Africa, especially with regards to implementing 
suitable funding structures that are not superficial fronting arrangements.   
 
Muller & Ward (2010) examined the long-term impact on the share prices of listed 
companies after announcements are made relating to black empowerment deals. Their 
study found a positive cumulative abnormal return of around 10% after the first year. They 
also found evidence suggesting that the positive result is confined to smaller companies, 
with market capitalisation of less than R3,5bn, whilst larger companies experience a 
marginally negative cumulative abnormal return. Their results also showed that those 
companies which made BEE announcements prior to May 2005 ('first phase') did 
somewhat worse than those who followed. 
 
Strydom et al (2009) argues that if BEE transactions are perceived by the market to 
represent an increase in the future earnings potential of the firm or a reduction in the 
riskiness of future earnings then the announcement of a BEE transaction should result in 
an increase in a firm's share price. They found that there is not a particular association 
between BEE transactions and negative abnormal returns. They found that in a limited 
number of cases that BEE transactions are associated with positive abnormal returns. 
Furthermore they suggest that the reaction may be related to firm specific and/or 
transaction specific characteristics. 
 
Ferreira and De Villiers (2011) investigated whether an association exists between a firm's 
black economic empowerment (BEE) score and its share returns. Their study focused on 
the relationship between an entity's BEE score, as opposed to a BEE deal announcement, 
and the entity's market performance. Their analysis showed a significant, negative 
association between a firm's BEE score and its share returns. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The importance of BEE is clearly evident from the discussions above. The South African 
government together with the business fraternity is continually studying ways in which to 
improve BEE. The big hindrance to BEE is unfortunately the scarcity of capital and skills 
amongst black people. This hindrance is magnified by the absence of a venture capital 
market in SA and the relatively small developmental finance that’s available. The relative 
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failures of developmental finance initiatives introduced by the government have also 
contributed to the failure of past BEE deals. There is, however, success stories and 
companies constantly attempt to use innovative ways to fund empowerment deals. A 
limited number of firms has since 2003 entered into Broad Based transactions that 
involved the broader South African public (South Africans at the bottom and middle of the 
economy ), including stokvels (traditional mechanism used by black south Africans that 
pool funds) and other black organisations such as churches, variety of black societies and 
black investment groups. The next chapter presents the methods and methodologies used 
in this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the methods and methodology adopted in this research. Market 
measures are used to establish whether these specific transactions have created value for 
the participants who invested in the deals. Accounting based measures are used to 
establish whether the funding methods used play a significant role to ensure the success 
of deals. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the data requirements 
and the sources of data.  Section 3.3 discusses the design of the research and the chapter 
summary summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 Data and data sources 
The purpose of this research is to establish whether ordinary Black South Africans were 
empowered by recently implemented BBBEE deals and whether the funding models 
played a significant role in ensuring the success of the deals. To achieve this, five deals of 
three JSE listed companies that were concluded between 2006 and 2010 are studied. The 
transactions were selected because of the following reasons. First, they were all 
concluded just before or after the 2008 global financial crisis that affected liquidity of 
financial markets globally. Second, these transactions all invited ordinary South Africans to 
participate in the transactions, which made them truly broad based. Lastly, these 
transactions were IPO-like, in the sense that shares were sold to the public and these 
shares were eventually listed once the empowerment period of the various transactions 
end. The companies selected are MTN (MTN Zakhele), Vodacom (Yebo Yethu) Media 24, 
a Naspers subsidiary (Welkom Yizani) and Multichoice – A subsidiary of Naspers 
(Phuthuma Nathi 1 and 2). The Naspers and Vodacom deals were principally done 
through unlisted wholly owned subsidiaries. 
 
Data was collected from Bloomberg, Equity Express, MTN Zakhele and from other sources 
such as company websites and the published annual financial statements of the 
companies that were studied. Information was also obtained from public company records 
other than the annual financial statements and organisations that specifically track the 
share performance of the specific empowerment organisations. 
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Required data consists of prospectuses provided to investors during road shows, 
presentations done by the companies explaining the specifics of the empowerment 
transactions and if possible specific funding agreements and term sheets so as to clearly 
understand the funding mechanisms and terms underlying the deals. The performance of 
the share prices of the listed empowering companies over a specific period was obtained 
from sources such as the Equity Express and Bloomberg. Dividends declared and paid by 
the specific companies were obtained from the abovementioned sources and also from 
published Annual Financial Statements. 
 
3.3 Research design 
The deals being studied pursue economic empowerment by transferring ownership of the 
companies to previously disadvantaged individuals at a fraction of the true value of the 
shares. This is done by the empowering companies financing a majority share of the 
purchase price. True empowerment would therefore only be achieved if economic value is 
created and the debts incurred to facilitate the transactions repaid. The returns created 
need to be sufficient enough to ensure that debts are repaid and the net asset value of 
each participant is increased as a result of participating in the scheme.  
In considering whether the funding method used was efficient and whether the economic 
empowerment objective was obtained or not, the following factors were taken into 
consideration: 
 
 
 The market returns created by the deals. This assessment is done by making a 
direct comparison between the cost incurred and the total returns earned on the 
investment. The research, therefore, investigates the value appreciation of the 
shareholders of the empowered shares since inception of the deal until 7 March 
2014.  
  The dividends that were earned during the period.  
 The extents to which loans and other financing have been repaid are also 
investigated. An efficient funding structure would be one that brought about 
economic returns for investors and changed the demographics of the shareholding 
of the target company.  
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3.3.1 Assessing value creation via market measure 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated to assess whether value was created 
for shareholders who participated in the deals. The JSE all-share index is used as a 
market benchmark. Compound annual growth rates (CAGR) for the market and the 
specific companies are also calculated and compared to assess the performance of the 
deals versus that of the market.  
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3.3.2 Accounting Measures and funding structures 
Funding structures are very important because the deals are highly geared and debt levels 
have a significant impact on the value of any company. In assessing the appropriateness 
and efficiency of the funding structures, we use various accounting measures. We look at 
the dividend received per ordinary share for each of the BBBEE companies. We need to 
emphasise that the dividend per share in this regard refers to ordinary dividends received 
from the holding companies by the BBBEE company per BBBEE shareholder. We look at 
the year on year debt per share, the debt equity ratio of the BBBEE company from 
implementation date till the end of the last available financial year as well as the return on 
equity (ROE) for each of the holding companies since implementation till the end of the 
last financial year. We analyse the year on year values for the outstanding debt per share 
for each BBBEE company, we analyse the dividend payment pattern and ROE of the 
holding companies. ROE’s are used to assess the performance and profitability of the 
holding companies because not all the holding companies are listed and ROE is the best 
alternative measure and is easy to calculate. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter outlined the sources of data and how the data was analysed to establish 
whether the funding structures used in BEE transactions enhance or destroy value for BEE 
beneficiaries. The next chapter presents the results and findings from the research. 
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CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction  
The objective of this chapter is to provide the results from the analysis of five BBBEE deals 
namely MTN Zakhele, Phuthuma Nathi 1 and 2, Welkom Yizani and Yebo Yethu. The 
chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 presents description of the deals. Section 4.3 
presents the market performance for each of the deals, section 4.4 deals with the debt 
aspects of the deals and accounting performance of holding companies. 
  
4.2  Description of deals 
4.2.1 The structure of the MTN Zakhele deal 
Table 1 below provides a summary of key information regarding the MTN Zakhele deal. 
The deal was implemented in November 2010 and runs until November 2016. Zakhele is a 
deal done by JSE listed, MTN limited, who, in conjunction with the PIC sold 4% of MTN 
limited to MTN Zakhele. MTN Zakhele is therefore, an investment vehicle holding 4% of 
MTN limited. The shareholding in MTN limited is Zakhele’s sole asset. The 4% holding 
carry full voting rights and is eligible to receive dividends from MTN limited like all other 
ordinary shareholders. The shareholders are allowed to trade their shares on an over- the- 
counter platform after an initial three year lock in period, and after the 6 year 
empowerment term all limitations and restrictions will be lifted. It is expected that Zakhele 
shares will be converted into MTN Limited shares after the 6 year empowerment term. 
Shareholders will only be allowed to sell their shares to black people or black groups with 
similar or better BBBEE status than themselves after the initial three years. Dividends 
received by MTN Zakhele from MTN, should first be applied to pay operating cost and 
taxes, than to pay dividends to preference shareholders, to redeem preference shares and 
other debt and after all these obligations are met, only then can ordinary dividends be 
declared and paid to ordinary shareholders. 
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      Table 1 – MTN Zakhele deal  
Key Deal information   
Total Deal Value R8.2bn 
Inception date 24/11/2010 
Limited trade commencement 24/11/2013 
Empowerment Term 6 years 
Deal expiry 24/11/2016 
Issue Price R 20 
 
MTN Zakhele raised the funds to buy the shares via an initial public offering, exclusively 
for black people and black groups. Other sources of funding include a donation from MTN, 
notional vendor financing from MTN and the issuance of preference shares.  
 
Table 2, Panel A below shows that R1.6 billion was raised from issuing 80 900 000 
ordinary shares to the black public R2.1 billion was raised from a preference share issue 
and R3.2 billion was provided by MTN in the form of notional vendor financing. MTN 
donated R1.2 billion to complete the funding requirements. Table 2 Panel B, gives an 
overview of how the funds raised were utilised. Thirty three million shares were bought 
from the PIC and about forty two million shares were bought from MTN in two tranches. 
The “A” preference shares are redeemable after 6 years and carried a fixed dividend rate 
until April 30, 2013. From 1 May 2013 the dividend rate has been 77% of prime. The “B” 
preference shares have a dividend rate of 88% of prime and are redeemable at any time 
during the empowerment period or at the end of the six year empowerment period. Table 2 
also shows how highly geared the transaction is. The notional vendor financing and the 
preference shares constitute 65% of the total transaction value and owners’ equity only 
contributed 20%.  
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Table 2- Funding of MTN Zakheke deal 
Panel A 
Source of funds ZAR’000 Share Quantities ‘000 
Equity raised Zakhele IPO 1618000                         80.90  
Class A BIC Preference shares 1440000   
Class B BIC Preference shares 720   
MTN Donation 1294000   
Notional Vendor Financing 3214000   
Total funds raised 8286000 
 
Panel B 
Use  of funds ZAR’000 Share Quantities ‘000 
Issue cost 189   
PIC sale Shares 3589000                      3300.  
MTN tranche 1 3214000                      2900  
MTN tranche 2 1294000                      1200.  
Total funds used 8286 
  
4.2.2 The structure of the Phuthuma Nathi deal 
Table 3 below contains key information regarding the two Phuthuma Nathi empowerment 
deals. Phuthuma Nathi (PN) consists of 2 empowerment transactions (PN1 and PN 2) that 
were concluded by a subsidiary of JSE listed Naspers Limited called Multichoice 
International Holdings (MIH).  MIH through its wholly owned subsidiary Multichoice South 
Africa Holdings (MCSAH) issued 45000 000 ordinary shares to Phuthuma Nathi (PN1) 
Limited and 22500 000 ordinary shares to Phuthuma Nathi 2 (PN2) limited at R50 a share. 
PN1 and PN2 combined own 20% of MCSAH. The empowerment term of both 
transactions is ten years. During the first 5 years, trading of PN shares was not allowed. 
The locked trade period ended after 5 years, which allowed investors to trade their shares 
with other black investors that had similar or better BEE credentials. The shares held by 
both PN1 and PN2 carry voting rights and are eligible to receive dividends. Dividends 
received by PN1 and PN2 from MCSAH, should first be applied to pay the operational cost 
and taxes of the organisations and only 20% may be paid to ordinary shareholders of PN.  
The rest of the dividends should be used to pay preference dividends and redeem 
preference debt  
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Table 3- Phutuma Nathi deals 
Key Deal information Phuthuma Nathi 1 Phuthuma Nathi 2 
Total Deal Value 2.2bn R1.1bn 
Inception date 01/12/2006 01/03/2007 
Limited trade commencement 01/12/2011 01/03/2012 
Empowerment Term 10 years 10 years 
Deal expiry 1/12/2016 01/03/2017 
Issue Price R 10 R 10 
 
Table 4 below shows how funds were raised and how the funds were utilised. The 
combined cost of purchasing the MCSAH shares was R3.3 billion as can be seen from 
panel B in table 4 below. Panel A shows that R675 million was raised from an equity offer 
to the black shareholders (67.5million shares at R10 a share) and R2.7 billion was raised 
via a preference share issue. 
 
Table 4- Funding of Phuthuma Nathi deal 
Panel A 
Source of funds                                       ZAR’000                 Share Quantities ‘000 
Equity raised PN1 450000                       45.000  
Preference Shares 180000                     180.000  
Equity raised PN2 225000                       22.500  
Preference Shares 
PN2 900000                       90.000  
Total funds raised 3375000 
 
Panel B 
Use of funds                                       ZAR’000                  Share Quantities ‘000 
MCSAH Shares (PN2) 2250                         45.000  
MCSAH Shares (PN1) 1125                         22.500  
Total funds used 3375 
     
4.2.3 The structure of the Welkom Yizani deal 
Table 5 below contains key information regarding the Welkom Yizani (WY) empowerment 
deal. The deal was initiated and implemented by Naspers limited through its wholly owned 
subsidiary Media 24 Holdings Limited. 
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 The deal was concluded in December 2006 and is expected to run through to December 
2018. The deal initially had an empowerment term of 10 years, but the term has been 
extended by two years. Media24 issued 14 600 000 shares to Welkom Yizani (WY) at R50 
a share. The Media 24 shares held by Welkom Yizani carry full voting rights and are 
eligible to receive dividends. Dividends received by WY from Media 24, should first be 
applied to pay the operational cost and taxes of the organisation and only 20% may be 
paid to ordinary shareholders of WY. The rest should be used to pay preference dividends 
and redeem preference debt 
 
Table 5 - Welkom Yizani deal 
Key Deal information   
Total Deal Value R730m 
Inception date 08/12/2006 
Limited trade commencement 08/12/2013 
Empowerment Term 12 years 
Deal expiry 08/12/2018 
Issue Price R 10 
 
 Table 6 below illustrates the quantum of funds raised, the sources of the funds and how 
the funds were utilised. R146 million was raised by Welkom Yizani via an equity offering to 
the qualifying black shareholders. 14.6 million Ordinary shares were issued at R10 a 
share. R584 million was raised via a preference share issue to Naspers Limited. The 
preference shares are redeemable over the empowerment term and the dividends are 
linked to prime.  
 
Table 6 Sources and uses of Welkom Yizani deal funds 
Source of funds ZAR’000 Share Quantities’000 
Equity raised WY 146000 14600 
Preference Shares 584000 584000 
Total funds raised 730000 
 
Use of funds ZAR’000 Share Quantities’000 
Media 24 730000 14600 
   
Total funds used 730000 
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4.2.4 The structure of the Yebo Yethu deal 
Table 7 below shows key information about the Yebo Yethu empowerment transaction. 
The deal was concluded and implemented by the JSE listed Vodacom Group Limited, 
through its subsidiary Vodacom South Africa (VSA) on the 1st of July 2008.The 
empowerment term of the deal is 10 years. The deal had a 5 year trade restriction that 
ended in February 2014. Yebo Yethu purchased a 3.44% stake in VSA. Yebo Yethu 
subscribed for 7200 000 VSA ordinary shares and 82 800 000 VSA “A” ordinary shares. 
The total cost of the 3.44% to Yebo Yethu was R2.25 billion The VSA ordinary shares 
carry full voting rights and are eligible for dividends. The VSA A ordinary shareholders will 
only be eligible to receive dividends once the outstanding notional vendor finance balance 
is settled. 
 
Table 7- Yebo Yethu deal  
Key Deal information   
Total Deal Value (public component) R2.25bn 
Inception date 01/07/2008 
Limited trade commencement 03/02/2014 
Empowerment Term 10 years 
Deal expiry 08/12/2018 
Issue Price R 25 
 
Table 8, Panel A below shows how Yebo Yethu raised funding to acquire the VSA ordinary 
shares. Yebo Yethu offered 14 400 000 ordinary shares to qualifying black South African 
individuals and groups at R25 a share. VSA donated shares worth R225 million and VSA 
provided Yebo Yethu with notional vendor financing of R1.6 billion. The R585 million 
raised via the equity offering and the donation from VSA was utilised to acquire 7.2 million 
VSA ordinary shares. Table 8, Panel B, shows that the notional vendor financing was 
utilised to acquire 82.8 million VSA A ordinary shares. Yebo Yethu owns 3.44% of the 
issued VSA shares but the black public (individuals and groups) only owns 55% of Yebo 
Yethu. 
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Table 8 Sources and uses of Yebo Yethu deal funds 
Panel A 
  Source of funds                   ZAR’000         Share Quantities’000 
Equity raised YY IPO 3 60 000 14400 
Notional Vendor Finance 1 665 000 
 VSA Donation 225 000 
 Total raised 2 250 000   
Panel B 
  Use of funds ZAR’000             Share Quantities’000 
VSA ordinary 585 000 7.20 
VSA A 1 665 000 82.80 
Total Applied 2250 
 
    
4.2.5 Deal Summary  
There are many similarities and also a few differences in the deals under investigation. 
Being BBBEE deals, it is not surprising that all the companies issued shares to black 
South Africans only, or groups of black South Africans and BBBEE qualifying 
organisations. All the deals have a restriction period during which shares were not allowed 
to trade, followed by a limiting trading period, during which shares may only be traded with 
BBBEE qualifying individuals and organisations. All the deals were highly geared, with the 
majority of the funding being provided by parent companies. MTN Zakhele is the only deal 
that had an external debt component. MTN Zakhele is also the only deal with an 
empowerment term of less than 10 years. The MTN Zakhele and Yebo Yethu deals were 
both beneficiaries of generous discounts. PN1, PN2 and Welkom Yizani used only a 
mixture of preference shares and equity for funding. MTN Zakhele however, used a 
mixture of notional vendor financing, preference shares, equity and the discount element. 
Yebo Yethu used only notional vendor financing, equity and a discount element.  
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4.3  Market Performance 
Table 8 -11 below illustrate the performance of the BBBEE share price since the initial 
public offering. The cumulative return is calculated for the period between initial offering 
(the implementation date) and the average trade price on the 1st day the share became 
eligible for trading. Returns are also calculated for the period from first trading date till 
March 7 2014. 
 
4.3.1 Performance of MTN Zakhele 
Table 8, Panel A, below shows that the Zakhele deal created abnormal returns during the 
locked trade period as the value of the share appreciated 350%. It also shows that during 
the same period the returns on the share outperformed the market by 306%.The returns 
for Zakhele subsequent to the trade restriction being lifted is 0.35% and it underperforms 
relative to the market. The total returns for Zakhele since implementation is 350% and it 
outperforms the market over the same period by 299%. 
 
Table 8 Performance of MTN Zakhele 
Panel A 
       
 
Trade Date Avg Price 
Div Adj 
Price 
R% Alsi Rm% CAR 
IPO Price 2010/11/24 20 20 
 
31112.490     
initial trade 2013/11/25 90 90 3.5 44552.512 0.431982 3.0680 
Last Trade 2014/03/07 93.03 93.03 0.0035599 47786.770 0.072594 (0.0690) 
        3.5035599   0.504576 2.9990 
Panel B 
 
Mtnz Alsi diff Mtnz Alsi diff 
IPO Price 20.000 31112.490   20.000 31112.490   
Trade Price 90.000 44552.512   93.030 47786.770   
Years 3.047 3.047     3.331         3.331   
CAGR 0.638 0.125 0.513   0.587        0.138 0.449 
 
 Table 8 Panel B shows that, the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) from inception till 
1st day of trading for the deal is 64% which is 51% better than the market. The CAGR since 
inception till 7 March 2014 is 58.7% and outperforms the market by 45%. 
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4.3.2 Performance of Phuthuma Nathi 1 and 2 
Table 9, Panel A, below shows that the PN1 deal, created abnormal returns during the locked 
trade period. The value of the share appreciated 221% and during the same period the 
returns on the share outperformed the market by 185%.The cumulative return since the deal 
was implemented is 431% and appears to be outperforming the market over the same period 
by 350%. 
 
Table 9 Performance of PN1 
Panel A 
       
PN1 
       
 
Trade Date Avg Price Div Adj Price R% Market Rm% CAR 
IPO Price 
01/12/2006 
10 10   24070.920     
initial trade 
2011/12/08 
30 32.14 2.21 32760.170 0.3609854 1.85301 
Last Trade 
2014/03/07 
96.08 99.57 2.10 47786.770 0.4586850 1.63932 
        4.31   0.8196704 3.49234 
Panel B 
 
PN1 Alsi diff PN2 Alsi diff 
IPO Price 10.000 24070.920   10.000 24070.920   
Trade Price 30.000 32760.170   99.570 47786.770   
Years 5.092 5.092   7.369 7.369   
CAGR 0.241 0.062 0.178 0.366 0.098 0.268 
 
 
Table 9, Panel B shows that The CAGR for PN1 during the locked period is 24% which is 17% 
better than the market. The CAGR subsequent to the locked period is even better than during 
the locked period and outperforms the market by 27%. 
 
Table 10, Panel A shows that the PN2 deal, created abnormal returns during the locked trade 
period. The value of the share appreciated 286% and during the same period the returns on 
the share outperformed the market by 257%.The cumulative return since the deal was 
implemented is 447% and appears to be outperforming the market over the same period by 
370%. 
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Table 10 Performance of PN2 
 Panel A  
       
PN2 
Trade Date Avg Price 
Div Adj 
Price 
R% Market Rm% CAR 
IPO Price 2007/03/01 10 10 
 
25336.6 
  initial trade 2011/12/08 36.5 38.64 2.86 32760.2 0.29300 2.57100 
Last Trade 2014/03/07 97.1 100.61 1.60 47786.8 0.45869 1.14509 
    
  
4.47 
 
0.75168 3.71609 
 
Panel B PN2 Alsi diff PN2 Alsi diff 
IPO Price 10.000 25336.580   10.000 25336.580   
Trade Price 36.500 32760.170   100.610 47786.770   
Years 4.842 4.842   7.119 7.119   
CAGR 0.307 0.055 0.252 0.383 0.093 0.290 
 
Table 10, Panel B above shows that the CAGR for PN2 is 31% which is 25% better than 
the market for the PN2 locked period. The CAGR since inception till 7 March 2014 is 
period is better than during the locked period and outperforms the market by 29%. 
 
4.3.3 Performance of Welkom Yizani 
Table 11 below shows Welkom Yizani did not produce abnormal returns during the locked 
trade period. The value of the share appreciated 67% and during the same period the 
returns on the share underperformed relative to the market. Market returns were 20% 
better over the same period. The share lost value in the period since trading commenced. 
The share dropped 35% whilst the market gained 6% over the same period. The 
cumulative return for the period since the deal was implemented is 32% and has 
underperformed relative to the market. The market appears to have outperformed the 
share by 63%. 
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Table 11 Performance of Welkom Yizani 
 Panel A 
       
WY Trade Date Avg Price Div Adj Price R% Market Rm% CAR 
IPO Price 2006/12/08 10 10   23760.590     
initial trade 
2013/12/09 
15.5 16.77 0.677 44732.422 0.8826310 (0.2056) 
Last Trade 
2014/03/07 
10 10.82 (0.3548) 47786.770 0.0682804 (0.4231) 
        0.3221998   0.9509114 (0.6287) 
 
Panel B WY Alsi diff WY Alsi diff 
IPO Price 10.000 23760.590   10.000 23760.590   
Trade Price 15.500 44732.422   10.820 47786.770   
Years 7.106 7.106   7.350 7.350   
CAGR 0.064 0.093 (0.030) 0.011 0.100 (0.089) 
 
Table 11, Panel B show that the CAGR for WY is 6% during the locked period versus the 
9% by the market over the same period. The CAGR since implementation till 7 March 
2014 underperforms relative to the market. The market’s CAGR is greater at 9% versus 
the 3% of Welkom Yizani. 
 
4.3.4 Performance of Yebo Yethu 
Table 12, Panel A shows that the Yebo Yethu deal created abnormal returns during the 
locked trade period. The share appreciated 92% and during the same period the returns 
on the share outperformed the market by 42%. The returns since trading are marginally 
better than the market. The cumulative return for the period is however still 94% and 
appears to be outperforming the market over the same period by 38%. 
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Table 12 Performance of Yebo Yethu 
Panel A 
       
 
Trade Date Avg Price Div Adj Price R% Market Rm% CAR 
IPO Price 
2008/07/01 
25 
  
30003.76 
  
initial trade 
2014/02/03 
48 52.43 0.920 44956.91 0.498376 0.42162 
Last Trade 
2014/03/07 
48.825 48.825 0.017 47786.77 0.062946 (0.04576) 
        0.937 
 
0.561322 0.37587 
Panel B 
 
YY Alsi diff YY Alsi diff 
IPO Price 25.000 30003.760   25.000 30003.760   
Trade Price 48.000 44956.910   48.825 47786.770   
Years 5.675 5.675   5.764 5.764   
CAGR 0.122 0.074 0.048 0.123 0.084 0.039 
 
The CAGR for the Yebo Yethu deal during the locked period is 12% versus a 5% for the 
market. The CAGR for Yebo Yethu outperforms the market by 4% over the period since 
inception till 7 March 2014. 
 
4.3.5 Comparative performance of the deals 
Table 12 below illustrates the mean returns of the individual deals since inception. The 
standard deviation and mean of the respective deals give us more insight into the risk and 
return relationships. Zakhele has the highest standard deviation, which can be interpreted 
as a high risk relative to the other investments. However taking into consideration the total 
cumulative abnormal return of Zakhele since inception, the risk investors took was 
handsomely rewarded. Yebo Yethu has the second highest standard deviation as can be 
seen from the table above, but also returned 94% since inception of the deal. 
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Table 12 Comparative descriptive statistics of the five BEE deals 
 Statistic Measure                  Zakhele          PN1               PN2            WY                YY 
Mean 0.136 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.039 
Variance 0.453 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.034 
Standard deviation 0.673 0.071 0.094 0.120 0.185 
Coefficient of Variance 4.941 7.841 12.206 17.902 4.725 
 
Puthuma Nathi 1 and 2 appears to be relatively low risk investments, judging by the 
standard deviation calculated above. Welkom Yizani standard deviation makes it the third 
riskiest deal and from the returns calculated, the Welkom Yizani deal performed the worst 
out of the 5 deals. The coefficient of variance, measures the risk return trade off. The lower 
the calculated coefficient variation the better is your risk return trade off. Zakhele and Yebo 
Yethu therefore offers the best risk return trade-offs and Welkom Yizani the worst. 
 
4.4  Accounting performance & Debt profile  
This section looks into the funding methods used and the funding profile of each deal to 
date. We also look at the accounting performance of each BBBEE company and the 
holding companies of each deal. Section 4.2 above give a background of each deal and 
briefly summarises how funds were raised and utilised. Table 13 below provides a 
summary of each deal and some specifics around the financing used. In summary, the 
table shows that the interest rates for all the deals were linked to the prime interest rate.All 
the deals used either preference shares or notional vendor financing or a combination of 
the two. The finance providers for every deal were the ultimate holding company. 
 
Table 13 – Type of financing on five BEE deals analysed 
 
Deal Instrument A Instrument B Interest rate Finance Provider 
Zakhele Preference Shares Notional Vendor Finance Prime linked MTN ltd & External Investors 
Puthuma 
Nathi1 Preference Shares N/A Prime linked Naspers 
Puthuma 
Nathi2 Preference Shares N/A Prime linked Naspers 
Welkom 
Yizani Preference Shares N/A Prime linked Naspers 
Yebo Yethu Notional Vendor Finance N/A Prime linked Vodacom SA 
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Table 14 below provides a summary of the debt equity ratios for the respective deals. 
Looking at the ratios calculated in the table, it is clear that the deals were highly geared at 
implementation. 
 
Table 14 – Debt ratios of BEE deals at implementation 
Deal Debt  Equity D/E ratio 
Zakhele 5374 1618 3.3 
PN1 1800 450 4 
PN2 900 225 4 
WY 584 146 4 
YY 1665 360 4.6 
 
Table 15 below illustrates the debt equity ratio for each deal at each year end. The 
objective of the year on year debt equity ratio is to analyse the impact of outstanding debt 
on the market and accounting performance of each deal. 
 
Table 15 – Debt ratios of BEE deals at implementation 
D/E ratios 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Zakhele 
   
1.031 0.875 0.650 
 Puthuma 
Nathi1 4.680 3.880 3.558 2.915 1.955 0.927 0.408 
Puthuma 
Nathi2 4.005 3.382 3.112 2.583 1.756 0.826 0.349 
Welkom 
Yizani 4.530 9.566 -50.272 3.497 3.615 5.111 1.904 
Yebo 
Yethu 
  
3.803 4.075 4.606 4.079 2.609 
 
Table 15 above shows that the gearing for each of the deals reduced with time. The debt 
ratio for Zakhele reduced from 1.03:1 to 0.65:1, both the Puthuma Nathi deals reduced 
from 4:1 to 0.4:1.Welkom Yizani reduced from 4.5:1, to 1.9:1 and Yebo Yethu reduced 
from 3.8:1 to 2.6:1. Further investigation is however, needed to establish what the 
underlying cause for the reduction in gearing is.  
 
Table 16 below gives an indication of outstanding debt per ordinary share for each BBBEE 
company at the end of their respective financial years. This is the outstanding rand amount 
for each ordinary share in issue. 
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Table 16 – Per share reduction in debt overtime 
Debt per 
Share  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Zakhele       
             
66.04           65.97  
          
62.81    
Puthuma 
Nathi1 
            
41.20  
         
43.74  
           
46.84  
             
48.54           44.73  
          
30.45  
          
18.36  
Puthuma 
Nathi 
            
40.01  
         
42.46  
           
45.41  
             
47.01           43.07  
          
28.61  
          
16.41  
Welkom 
Yizani 
            
41.07  
         
44.02  
           
47.56  
             
26.90           27.78  
          
28.39  
          
28.86  
Yebo 
YethuY     
        
234.80  
           
232.04        234.15  
       
235.90  
        
163.98  
 
Table 16 above indicates that debt per share for each of the deals has reduced with time. 
Zakhele’s debt reduced by 5%, PN1 and PN2 by 55% and 59% respectively, Welkom 
Yizani by 29% and Yebo Yethu by 30%.This may lead one to think the debt is being 
repaid. However, further analysis is required to establish whether the debt per share 
reduced due to repayments of debt or because of other reasons.Dividends are the main 
source of income for each of the BBBEE companies as they are all investment holding 
companies. The accounting performance of the holding companies is therefore of 
paramount importance for the BBBEE companies, because their share in the holding 
company is their only asset. Companies pay dividends out of profits, a profitable company 
therefore, is more likely to pay dividends than a company that does not consistently make 
profits. This therefore leads us to Table 17 
 
Table 17 – Annual return on equity 
ROE 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
MTN 
   
20.16 25.82 23.28 25.84 
MCSAH 2.26 0.46 0.41 0.37 0.40 0.59 0.65 
Media24 0.26 0.08 0.34 0.19 0.34 (0.19) (0.08) 
Naspers 14.15 12.89 17.59 9.69 14.15 6.56 11.94 
Vodacom 
  
47.91 30.24 56.16 59.48 66.06 
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Table 17 contains the annual return on equity for each of the holding companies. MTN, 
Vodacom and Multichoice South Africa Holdings all have consistent positive return on 
equity numbers. Media 24 is more inconsistent than the other 3 companies and also has 
negative returns for their financial years ending 2012 and 2013.The ROE for Naspers, the 
holding company of both Media 24 and Multichoice, also appears to be more inconsistent 
than MTN and Vodacom. A deeper look into the accounting profits of the four holding 
companies reveals good growth in profits for MTN, Vodacom and Multichoice. Media 24 on 
the other hand made losses in the 2012 and 2013 financial years. 
  
Table 18 below provides a univariate analysis of the equity returns. The statistics 
calculated in the table positively corroborates the statistics calculated on the market 
returns of the BBBEE companies under section 4.3.5. MTN and Vodacom have relatively 
high risk return trade-offs. Multichoice has the third highest with Media 24 the lowest. 
Naspers is included because it is the ultimate holding company of Multichoice and Media 
24 
 
Table 18 – Univariate analysis of return on equity 
Company Mean Var Std dev 
MTN 23.78 5.45 2.34 
MCSAH 0.73 0.39 0.63 
Media24 0.13 0.03 0.19 
Naspers 12.42 10.70 3.27 
Vodacom 51.97 152.27 12.39 
 
Table 19 below provides a summary of dividends received by the BBBEE companies from 
the assets they hold. We looked at the dividends received to establish whether dividends 
received would enable debt servicing and debt repayment and redemption. 
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Table 19 – Total annual dividends per share received by Empowerment Shareholders 
Company 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Zakhele 
   
0.63 5.79 7.42 
 
Puthuma Nathi1 2.17 2.31 2.67 8.00 17.78 14.82 13.33 
Puthuma Nathi2 2.17 2.31 2.67 8.00 17.78 14.80 13.33 
Welkom Yizani 1.54 1.70 1.70 1.03 1.28 1.41 1.45 
Yebo Yethu 
  
9.17 26.33 21.09 21.78 35.96 
 
Table 19 shows that four of the companies paid dividends at an increasing rate per 
annum. Zakhele’s dividend received increased by a 1000% over  the 3 years, Puthuma 
Nathi by 500% and Yebo Yethu 300%.This can be seen as evidence that the holding 
companies were committed to the success of the BBBEE deals, and therefore aligned their 
dividend policies accordingly.  
 
Welkom Yizani’s dividends received are more consistent at around or less than R1,50 per 
share per annum with dividends for one year being as little as R1 per share. From the 
dividend received per share, we can therefore see why Zakhele, Puthuma Nathi and Yebo 
Yethu were able to reduce their debt levels considerably.  
 
Table16 shows that that, the debt for Welkom Yizani reduced from R40 per share to R28 
per share. This is interesting considering dividends received by Welkom Yizani were 
relatively low, the inconsistency in the performance of Media 24 and the fact that Media 
24’s ROE information reveals losses in the last two financial years. According to the 2010 
AFS of Welkom Yizani, Naspers wrote of R330 M with of preference share debt to assist 
the Welkom Yizani shareholders. A press release regarding the assistance states that the 
assistance was needed due to a down turn in the media industry caused by the global 
economic recession. 
 
Another key aspect is the relative low interest environment that the South African economy 
finds itself in. Interest rates have been at record lows over the last couple of years. The 
repo rate reached a record low of 5% in recent years. This ensured relative low interest 
expenses that assisted the performance of the deals. The low interest rates also meant 
more disposable income for consumers, which meant consumers could spend more on 
pay TV, and communication cost. 
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Chapter Summary 
The analysis shows that all five deals were financed mainly by the holding companies of 
the BBBEE companies or the parent companies of the holding companies. The importance 
of profitable holding companies was also highlighted, because the BBBEE companies rely 
heavily on dividends to service and repay debt. Outstanding debt levels are very important 
as debt has a direct impact on company value. Our analysis also shows the importance of 
dividend policies of holding companies. The low interest rate environment we also found 
very important as the deals were highly geared.  
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CHAPTER 5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the results of the research and provide the 
conclusion of the study. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the 
results discussion. Section 5.3 provides the conclusion of the study and section 5.4 deals 
with recommendation for further study. 
 
5.2 Results Discussion 
To assess the efficiency of the deals, we first establish whether the deals had brought 
about economic value for the black shareholders that participated in the deals. We 
establish that four of the deals have created relatively good value as all these deals 
outperformed the market since inception. These returns created serves to answer 
Kritzinger (2004), who asked whether the intended beneficiaries of broad based 
empowerment will bear the intended fruits of the transactions and the BBBEE policy. This 
finding is also in line with previous research by Muller &Ward (2010) that found abnormal 
returns created by BEE deals. This is further corroborated by Strydom et al (2009) who 
found positive returns on a selected number of BEE deals with certain firm specific 
characteristics. 
We then analysed what the factors were that had an impact on the success of the deals. 
We analysed the mixture of debt and equity funding, we identified whether the funders 
were internal or external companies and identified key features of the debt structures. 
Whilst performing the analysis we noticed that majority of the deals had preference shares 
as part of their debt structure. Only Yebo Yethu didn’t have preference shares and we also 
noticed that the Yebo Yethu and Zakhele deals had a discount component and a vendor 
financing component. All the deals also had resulted in an investment company being 
formed (SPV), who held shares in the company implementing empowerment and seeking 
to transfer shareholding to black South Africans All these BEE funding mechanisms and 
structures are in line with the funding of BEE studies per Nhlapo (2008).. 
Historically BEE deals were criticised for being too narrow, for not transferring ownership 
to black people (Santorius & Botha 2008, Nhlapo 2008) and the failures of deals were 
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blamed on the high level of debt (Nhlapo 2008, Business Map 1999). We find that although 
all the deals we analysed were highly leveraged, the leverage assisted in maximizing the 
returns on investments. 
 
We find that although the funding structures play a crucial role that they do not necessarily 
determine the failure or success of the empowerment deals as suggested by Nhlapo 
(2008) and Business Map 1999. We find the capital structures of the deals studied to be in 
line with capital structure studies by Frank and Goyal, (2003); Bharat, Pasquariello and 
Wu, (2008), who found that debt is preferred over equity due to the confidence signal it 
carries and because debt is relatively cheaper finance. We found that the performance of 
the empowering companies is a more important factor in determining the success of 
empowerment deals. We also found that the majority of the funding on the deals was 
internal funding, as most of the empowering companies used their internal funds to fund 
the deals. This corroborates the pecking order of finance theory (Franck and Goyal, 2003) 
that states that internal financing is preferred to external financing. The internal funding 
also played a crucial role in ensuring that the Welkom Yizani deal stays on track to reach 
its empowerment imperative. Naspers the parent company of Media 24, the empowering 
company, waived a big component of outstanding debt and accrued preference dividends. 
Management also send a confidence signal to the market by waiving debt. This would 
have been almost impossible or much more complicated if the debt providers were 
external financial institutions. Another important aspect was the discount provided by 
empowering companies on the MTN Zakhele and the Yebo Yethu deal. This discount 
signalled management’s confidence in the deals and also lifted the NAV of the BBBEE 
companies. Another important aspect we found was the dividend policy of the holding 
companies. Dividends are crucial because it is the sole income of the empowered 
companies and it enables empowered companies to pay interest and redeem debt.  
 
5.3 Conclusion of the study 
The objective of the study was to assess the efficiency of funding structures used in 
BBBEE deals. In conclusion, we found that although funding structures do play a very 
important role, it does not necessarily negatively affect the performance of the deals. 
Efficient funding structures are important; however the performance of the holding 
company and the dividend policies of the company play a bigger and more crucial role in 
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the success of BBBEE deals. We therefore encourage more companies to do similar 
broad based empowerment deals, and to use internal funding as much as it possibly can. 
Companies seeking empowerment should also focus on the growth and profitability of the 
empowering company and should ensure that dividend policies are aligned with its 
empowerment objective. 
 
5.4 Recommendations for further study 
A number of concepts in the study can be explored and studied further 
 More broad-based empowerment deals could be included and a broader sample 
with companies from more industries 
 A study could be done once the empowerment term for all the deals had come to an 
end to identify whether the empowering companies maintained their empowerment 
status and whether shareholders value grew more 
 Tax efficiency of the structure of BBBEE deals could be studied 
 Surveys could be done to establish whether the shareholders feel empowered and 
whether they would participate in such schemes’ again 
 The impact of the BBBEE deals on the share returns and profitability of the 
empowering companies can be studied 
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